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BIG GUYS, BABIES, AND BEAUTY
by Nancy Easterlin
The intellectual climate of postmodernism has not been par-ticularly encouraging for the development of an evolutionary
theory of the arts. Concentrated in constructionist modes of analysis
and interpretation for the past thirty years, the social sciences and
humanities have asserted that aesthetic objects and practices are
produced and regulated by social and cultural structures, and serve
overwhelmingly to reinforce those structures. In its most extreme form,
postmodern constructionism claims that all meaning or significance
derives from social and cultural factors, and that perceived truth is a
matter of agreement or a function of power. If, for instance, we like
Edward Weston’s photographs and Georgia O’Keefe’s paintings be-
cause we observe striking similarities between the organic forms repre-
sented in them and features of the human form, postmodernism
counsels us that our preferences are dictated by social and cultural
regulators, such as current discourses about nature and art, and not in
any way by predisposed attractions to types of natural objects or to the
relationships between them.
Certainly, it would be foolhardy to argue that social and cultural
context have no influence on either the type of art that is produced or
its reception in any given culture, but a thoroughgoing or strong
Art and Intimacy: How the Arts Began, by Ellen Dissanayake; xvii & 265 pp.
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000, $29.95.
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constructionism is another matter.1 Strong constructionism cannot
explain—or, to be more accurate, refuses to explain—why we have art
in the first place. Recent intellectual fashion has dictated, in sum, that
the most interesting questions about art, the truly thought-provoking
and hard questions, should not be asked. Yet even in an era inimical to
the study of complexity, some scholars will continue to grapple with the
interesting questions. So it is that within the past twelve years Ellen
Dissanayake has published three books that together stand as the major
contribution to an evolutionary understanding of the arts.
Dissanayake’s three books—What Is Art For? (1988); Homo Aestheticus:
Where the Arts Come From and Why (1992); and, most recently, Art and
Intimacy: How the Arts Began (2000)—build on one another, elaborating
a functional account of the genesis and adaptive value of the arts.2 It is
fitting that each volume amplifies Dissanayake’s central theory, repre-
senting, as it were, a new stage in that theory’s evolution, for elaboration
is a key concept in Dissanayake’s work.
First and foremost, Dissanayake establishes the need for a functional
account of art in What Is Art For? before developing her central thesis.
Pointing out that what we know of pre-industrial cultures is inconsistent
with the traditional approach to aesthetics, Dissanayake fruitfully sug-
gests we readjust our intellectual lens. Whereas aestheticians have been
preoccupied for centuries with discovering a transcendent essence for
art, a functional and evolutionary account reveals the myopia of such
an approach. Premodern cultures, because they do not separate life
into discrete categories including the real and everyday, the imaginative
and aesthetic, and the religious, have no concept of art apart from
everyday activities or utilitarian considerations and, therefore, the study
of these cultures calls the existence of a transcendent art essence into
question. As constructionist colleagues would be happy to point out,
the quest for essences does indeed attest to a cultural bias, that
particular bias being an overwhelming tendency to conceptualize in
rigid dualities within modern western culture; simultaneously, the quest
for essences conflicts with an evolutionary understanding of human
beings and their practices. In thus preparing the ground for her central
argument, Dissanayake recommends persuasively the need for a major
shift in focus among aestheticians, who are encouraged to look at how
art behaviors work in adaptively significant ways within human social
life.
In Dissanayake’s account, all of those activities, adornments, and the
like in pre-industrial culture that we today see as the ancestors of
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modern art forms exemplify a predisposition toward elaboration or, in
her chosen phrase, making special. Carvings on tools; nonfunctional,
decorative features on baskets and pottery; and the visual, aural, and
performative patterns of ritual, for example, are all evidence of the
propensity to make special, which in some sense removes objects and
activities from the world of the everyday and places them, for members
of traditional societies, within a magical or supernatural world, yet not
within a separate sphere of art. A feature, Dissanayake asserts, “as
distinguishing and universal in humankind as speech or the skillful
manufacture and use of tools,” making special has two adaptive
functions: first, it imposes a civilizing order on everyday things and
experience, and thus promotes a psychological sense of mastery and
control; second, it promotes group cohesion, through shared activities,
images, and the like (p. 92).
Hence, in her first book, Dissanayake lays the groundwork for a
functional account of art by providing an evolutionary and anthropo-
logical perspective for readers unfamiliar with such a point of view; in
her second book, Homo Aestheticus, she builds on this behavioral
approach by incorporating significantly more cognitive science and
neurophysiological research into her analysis to support her central
claims. At the outset, Dissanayake stresses the psychological need of
humans for perceived control over experience and the importance of
art in facilitating feelings of mastery. As she explains, the first step
toward neutralizing anxiety is to crystallize an apparent problem
through representation, and art and ritual as forms of representation
are accordingly instrumental as mechanisms for the psychological
control of experience. For preindustrial persons who are highly intelli-
gent and capable of conscious reflection yet at the same time subject to
numerous threats from their environment, the need for such psycho-
logical control must be great. What is required is a sense of dromena, or
things done, a concept Dissanayake borrows from Jane Ellen Harrison.
Art, a uniquely human means of elaborating objects beyond the
everyday, is a way of producing dromena, and thus of feeling masterful
under potentially overwhelming circumstances.
 In her discussion of the protoaesthetic, Dissanayake observes that all of
the elements of making special are inherently pleasing to human
beings. Geometric symbols, for instance, don’t occur in nature, yet they
are evident in all early human art, indicating a human propensity for
form. Concurrently, however, playing with form, indicating a predispo-
sition toward novelty, is just as evident in early art as form itself.
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Apparently, then, two contrary predispositions, one toward formal
organization and one toward pattern-breaking, strongly inflect art
behaviors. With this discussion of the protoaesthetic, Dissanayake
begins to address the often neglected difference between perceived
beauty in our environment and the aesthetic features of artworks.
Whereas Dissanayake’s first two books articulate a phylogenetic
account of art and explain the cognitive features underlying both the
elements of art and its mental processing, her new book, Art and
Intimacy: How the Arts Began, offers an ontogenetic perspective on the
evolution and perpetuation of the arts. While Dissanayake’s central
thesis about art, that art is a mode of making special that facilitates
psychological control and group cohesion, has remained consistent,
she has come to incorporate increasing amounts of cognitive and
developmental research into her centrally anthropological approach.
The claim of this new book, that intimacy or love and art are
fundamentally related and grow out of the first relationship of infant to
mother, is original and, although it seems unusual to use the word in
the context of nurture, daring. “Mothers and infants?” we hear the
aestheticians protest, “But we thought our subject was Art.”
Mothers and infants indeed. Human infants, as Dissanayake explains,
are predisposed toward emotional communion with others, because
emotional communion facilitates the physical proximity of caregivers
and consequently improves the likelihood of survival for human neo-
nates, who are born, due to the pressures for early birth caused by
encephalization and upright posture, in a state of extraordinary depen-
dency. Adults, but especially women, and most especially an infant’s
primary caregiver/mother, are in turn predisposed to respond to a
baby’s facial expressions, sounds, and gestures, because the mutual
emotional attachment of child and mother that promotes survival
simultaneously enhances the parent’s inclusive fitness (i.e., her ability to
reproduce her genes in succeeding generations). The rhythms and
modes of infancy, which establish and continually reaffirm strong
attachment and are based in the turn-taking, affective exchanges be-
tween mother and child, arose in our hominid past and are still a major
feature of our developmental repetoire, but their importance doesn’t
end with adulthood. They remain, in Dissanayake’s view, a fundamental
feature of our adult emotional and psychological repetoire, serving as
the substrate for our mature rhythms and modes of love and art.
What are these rhythms and modes? By rhythm, Dissanayake ex-
plains, “I mean to suggest movement in time and the sense of forward
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flow of sound and nonsound, both ‘natural’ (or biological) and
humanly organized in performances of love and art” (p. 6). Mode,
whose meaning overlaps with rhythm, also suggests emotional and
sensory states or mode-of-being, and particularly reflects the preverbal
experience of unified perception. The rhythms and modes enacted and
experienced in mother-infant interactions are distinct from adult
interactions, as cross-cultural studies of the past several decades demon-
strate. When adults speak to infants, they speak in a higher, softer, sing-
song voice, and they often speak as though they expect a reply, even to
extremely young infants. Rocking, patting, and smiling often accom-
pany talking to babies, and “the things [mothers] say are structured in
time, like poetry or song: if transcribed, they reveal formal segments
like stanzas, often based on one theme (with variations) that has to do
with the looks or actions of the baby (frequently its digestion: burps,
hiccups, and poops) or something about its lovability—for example,
‘Mommy loves you. Yes. Yes. Did you know Mommy loves you? Yes she
does. She does. She loves you’” (p. 30).
It’s more than likely that, had Dissanayake proposed this theory fifty
years ago, she would have been laughed out of the country’s lecture
halls. We live in a culture that little understands how our attitudes
toward young children not only reflect what we are but also define what
we will become. Assuredly, second-wave feminism (not to mention post-
Vietnam economic conditions), has changed the scene somewhat,
bringing many women back into the workplace and therefore requiring
an adjustment in attitude toward women and their concerns; but on the
whole, the relegation in the past several centuries of women to the
household where labor is overwhelmingly comprised of the care of
children has led to a devaluation of childrearing along with a corre-
spondingly distorted enthusiasm for paid work. From a sociobiological
point of view alone, this situation is illogical: one only increases
inclusive fitness when, after successfully reproducing, one nurtures and
provides for children. Yet when infants are mentioned in a serious
argument, people seem uncomfortable and embarrassed, as though the
speaker has brought her knitting to a meeting with the dean. Thank-
fully, developmental psychology has blossomed since the mid-1960s,
and it is Dissanayake’s marshalling of this significant body of research in
the service of her argument that renders it, far from an example of
wish-fulfilling latter-day feminism, convincing and even profound.
Dissanayake’s use of developmental theories is accurate and authori-
tative, as readers of this literature will attest. Drawing on a host of
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developmentalists, including John Bowlby, Daniel Stern, and Colwyn
Trevarthen, the last of whom Dissanayake has worked with in Scotland,
Dissanayake establishes that the emotional rewards of mother-infant
interaction, because of the strong bond they encourage, are the crucial
link to reproductive success. The rhythms and modes of art are
embedded in this process, and Dissanayake’s discussion of baby talk
gives a clear example of how this works: “Baby talk . . . has nothing to do
with the exchange of verbal information about the world and every-
thing to do with participating in an impromptu expression of accord
and a narrative of feelings, ideas, and impulses to act. It is this wish to
share emotional experience that motivates early vocalization . . . and
sets a child on ‘the path to spoken language,’ as the neurobiologist of
language John L. Locke (1993) nicely described it—not the instrumen-
tal need to request or name things, which comes later” (p. 45). If the
notion that infants are motivated to speak not through a utilitarian
need to name things but by a desire for communion and meaning-
making seems far-fetched to some readers, familiarity with develop-
ment and cognitive psychology affirms that this is the accepted picture
of the infant in those fields.3 Language acquisition theorists, in fact,
believe that innate narrativity precedes language and drives its develop-
ment; the infant is eager for the enhanced communion with and power
to influence mother and others in his circumscribed world. Thus
reproductive fitness, emotional and psychological well-being, verbal
facility, and the protoaesthetic patterning of narrative are all improved
or encouraged through baby-talk.
In insisting on the priority of mother-infant mutuality, Dissanayake
has written an intellectually and socially significant book. The gaze
behaviors, prespeech, and early gestures of infants, far from being
randomly directed, are oriented toward the mother and others who, in
responding and perpetuating interaction, are instrumental in the
infant’s developing sociality and sense of self. One need only glance
through the work of a leading developmentalist like Daniel Stern to get
a picture of the substantive basis of Dissanayake’s theory.4 It is hard,
then, to see how Dissanayake’s thesis cannot in an important sense be
right for, given a normative genetic make-up, mutuality is the founda-
tion of all developing competences.
Peculiarly, it is just the demonstrable priority of the mother-infant
relationship that points to a potential weakness in the author’s thesis, to
wit: if mutuality is the foundation of everything for the normal infant,
then it is the foundation of everything, and we are addressing a general
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theory of the correspondences between early developmental relation-
ships and behaviors and adult behaviors, which is something other than
a specific theory of the arts. And instructively, Dissanayake’s claim is not
exclusively about art; her theory states that the rhythms and modes of
infancy underlie art behaviors and adult love, two very different sorts of
behavior with distinct proximate motivations and emotional bases.
Assuming her hypothesis is correct, then, do not the rhythms and
modes of infancy serve as the emotional and social substrate for other
adult human relationships and experiences, such as friendships, work
relationships, and feelings of professional competence? While I suspect
that the answer to this question is “yes”—that mother-infant mutuality
establishes the emotional and social dynamic of all the activities of later
life—I would not make too much of this as a criticism of Art and
Intimacy. Among other things, by focusing on the impact of infant
development on art specifically, Dissanayake addresses a concrete
instance of early experience’s overwhelming impact on human life.
The author’s ability to locate her argument amidst the theoretical
considerations of humanities disciplines on the one hand and social
scientific statements about the nature and meaning of the arts on the
other is one of the strengths of her book, showing that her perspective
and theory are not discipline-bound but instead relevant to diverse
groups of scholars. Today, cultural constructionists and evolutionary
biologists typically speak past each other, or only to themselves; but
Dissanayake addresses both groups. Speaking to constructionists, she
makes effective use of personal experience, noting that her periods of
residence in Sri Lanka over the past fifteen years have confirmed her
sense of the “incommensurability of cultures” while nonetheless mak-
ing her, as she says, “the opposite of a fanatical cultural relativist: I have
in fact become more impressed with the deeper human similarities that
underlie cultural differences. I have become, that is, a firm advocate of
a common human nature” (p. 11).
If even constructionists would have difficulty arguing with her broad
experience of life in varied cultures, which complements her psycho-
logical research to supply a concrete basis for her assumptions about
developmental universals, evolutionary theorists, likewise, should at-
tend to her criticisms of their use of the term “aesthetic,” which should
not, in Dissanayake’s view, be applied generally to all that human beings
find attractive, interesting, or arousing. Dissanayake has, in fact, been
pointedly critical of so-called evolutionary aesthetics, which conflates a
predisposition to find attractive certain features of environments or
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persons with aesthetic considerations, and it is in response to evolutionary
aesthetics that she has developed her concept of the protoaesthetic, first
discussed in Homo Aestheticus. In short, understanding biologically based
patterns and subjects as protoaesthetic requires us to distinguish those
phenomena from their representation in art: though the rhythms of a
mother’s voice may predispose us to respond emotionally to certain
metrical patterns in poetry, they do not predetermine the aesthetic
efficacy of poems adhering to that pattern. Similarly, the features of
landscape that people find attractive cannot be added together ran-
domly to produce an aesthetically viable painting, as Dissanayake
pointed out several years ago in the pages of this journal in her
discussion of Komar and Melamid’s amusing Painting by Numbers, a
book describing an experiment in which the authors polled individuals
about their preferences and then painted a picture comprised of all the
favored objects.5 Surely common sense tells us all that such an experi-
ment must fail, yet the presuppositions of evolutionary aesthetics
nonetheless imply its success, equating as that subdiscipline does
preferences with aesthetic judgment. Indeed, Dissanayake’s insistence that
there is a crucial distinction between adaptive preferences and aesthetic
qualities also invites reconsideration of theorists in the humanities like
Rudolph Arnheim and Morse Peckham, both of whom made pioneer-
ing attempts to connect bioevolutionary considerations with formal
preferences in art nearly forty years ago.6
Just as Dissanayake’s comments on evolutionary aesthetics expose a
simplistic and therefore unsatisfactory concept of the elements of art,
her criticism of evolutionary biology’s received notion of the function
of art reveals a one-sided perspective in need of correction. Explaining
(and, indeed, ultimately sharing) evolutionary theory’s view that hu-
mans expend energy toward survival-related ends and that, in conse-
quence, extravagant behaviors like the arts with no directly apparent
reproductive value form something of a puzzle, Dissanayake enumer-
ates the shortcomings of the reigning evolutionary hypothesis of art
behavior. This hypothesis holds that forms of display—singing, danc-
ing, building, speaking well, etc.—promote reproductive success be-
cause they provide the opportunity for males to draw attention to their
superior qualities and, as a result, to be preferentially selected as mates
by females. Unwilling to dismiss this analysis entirely, Dissanayake
incorporates it into a broader perspective: “evidence indicates that
male competition is only one, and not the most important, driving
force for human elaborations. Male competition cannot account for
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the arts of females . . . for the arts of men and women older than prime
reproductive age . . . or for the obvious fact that the arts, even when
they also serve competitive interests, are often co-created and per-
formed by more than one person” (pp. 135–36). Dissanayake maintains
that the ceremonies of traditional societies are gratifying because their
rhythms and modes derive from mother-infant mutuality, which chal-
lenges the regnant evolutionary view to reconsider its own causal
hypothesis, even as it implies that the emotional rewards of sexual
competition and those of cooperation may not be mutually exclusive
and may, in fact, have a shared origin in early experience.
Like Sarah Hrdy’s Mother Nature and, on the popular market, Natalie
Angier’s Woman, Art and Intimacy asks us to think more holistically in
theorizing the evolutionary value of human behaviors.7 Loath to toss
out big guys, babies, and bathwater in one ritual clean-up, these books
compel us to ask what role men and women play in any evolved behavior.
At the same time that theirs is a feminist perspective (either implicitly
or explicitly, depending on the author), it is also a more scientific and
specifically Darwinian perspective than that which, in the service of
biocultural analysis, ignores the role of women. Since feminist analyses
of science have pointed to male bias to discredit sociobiology (along
with rationalism and scientific empiricism in general), Art and Intimacy,
like the recent work of Hrdy and Angier, will help to restore the viability
of Darwinian approaches within the humanities and social sciences.
That the authors of these books extend and elaborate evolutionary
arguments in promising ways is not, needless to say, of secondary value
to the political consideration of restoring Darwinism’s credibility among
female scholars.
To some readers of this journal, Dissanayake’s unwillingness to move
from general theory to in-depth analysis of specific artworks may prove
somewhat disappointing. In fact, to the degree that she treats specific
manifestations of the arts at all, her discussions are typically either of
the ceremonial rituals of traditional societies or of visual objects such as
paintings. Although she does connect salient literary themes with
universal biological patterns and is well-acquainted with the work of
Joseph Carroll and Robert Storey, the two most prominent theorists in
evolutionary literary studies, she shies away from speculating at length
about how the rhythms and modes of infancy are elaborated in the
production, distribution, reading/viewing, and reception of particular
works of art, especially literary art.8
One possible reason for this refusal to engage in the specific analysis
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of literary works is a bias against language-oriented culture, expressed
not only here but in What Is Art For? and Homo Aestheticus as well. The
spread of literacy and with it the spread of a language-oriented culture
whose tendency is to subserve rationalism, to hone the ability to make
fine discriminations, and to reward problem-solving and critical think-
ing—to parcel out by geometric rules, as Wordsworth would have it—
leaves untended (or undertended) the psychological needs tradition-
ally met by the mythopoetic and holistic force embodied in religious
ritual. In the latter portion of her book, Dissanayake is intent on
revealing our culture’s neglect of the arts and on arguing that public
attention to the arts will help alleviate the fragmentation and meaning-
lessness of contemporary culture. The points need to be treated
separately. First, while it is true that contemporary culture does little for
any development of the arts, almost anyone reading Dissanayake’s book
is apt to be interested in art in the first place, and therefore unlikely to
benefit from an argument he or she would willingly endorse. Instead,
such readers might benefit most from specific examples, which would
enable them to bring Dissanayake’s theory into discussions with friends
and students about theatrical performances, paintings, music, literary
works, and the like.
Second, Dissanayake’s assumption that art can alleviate contempo-
rary cultural fragmentation is problematic, and exemplifies a near-
universal tendency in anthropological analysis to romanticize tradi-
tional cultures, which have not yet been ravaged by the consumerism,
waste, complexity, and accelerated greed of modern life. Anyone living
today sympathizes with the view that we’ve somehow made our lives just
too complicated and that a bit of simplicity would be a nice thing. But
we are nonetheless beholden to remind ourselves that we cannot return
to a past life and time. How much power does art have to reintegrate
our experience? Given that so much modern art not only ponders the
problems of fragmentation, alienation, and meaninglessness but is in
many cases inspired by them in the first place, the power of these
phenomena to restore holistic consciousness is most likely a distinctly
limited and qualified one.
None of this alters the fact that, along with What Is Art For and Homo
Aestheticus, Art and Intimacy is a major work of cultural analysis. Basing
her work on thorough and wide-ranging research in the sciences and
social sciences, Dissanayake demonstrates that a revisionary humanism
supported not by truistic claims but by a documented understanding of
what people are may hold the promise of the intellectual future for the
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humanities. Certainly postmodern constructionists have so foreshort-
ened the range of acceptable interpretations of cultural phenomena
that they are running out of things to say. Indeed, not in spite of but
rather because of the parameters she has set for her own project,
Dissanayake’s book opens up possibilities for the analysis of specific
works and types of art as well as for general theoretical considerations,
and will invigorate the study of art for many years to come.
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